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The cross-appellant, David Moore, pursuant to Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to decide
this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court

Decree provided

for a minimum

err in finding that
subsistence

level of

the Divorce
$1,500 per

month, which amount was to continue for a minimum of three years
regardless of remarriage or emancipation, irrespective of the trial
court's finding that $300 per month was designated alimony and $200
a month per child was designated as child support?
2.

Did the trial court err in denying David Moore's Motion

to Alter or Amend Judgment and by concluding that David Moore alone
was to provide medical coverage for the children, including the
payment

of all premiums, deductibles, co-payments and uninsured

medical expenses, irrespective of the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§78-45-7.1 and §78-45-7.15?

1

3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that cash payments

made directly to the children, and all other payments of gifts to
the children from David Moore in the form of cash, clothing, cars
or

car

repair,

vacations,

or

other

miscellaneous

expenses,

including health insurance premiums and medical expenses, are not
to be considered child support?
4.

Did the trial court err in not reducing Moore's child

support obligation based on the change in his finaincial situation
after entry of the Decree of Divorce?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's findings of fact may be set aside if found
to be clearly erroneous.

Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure; Mauqrhan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The trial court's legal conclusions will be given no deference and
will be reviewed for legal correctness.

General Glass Corp. v.

Mast Construction Co. 754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The following statutory provision are determinative of the
issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(5)
2

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.1
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is a divorce proceeding, specifically dealing with
child support issues.

This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment entered after a bench trial held
on October 27, 1993.

Also appealed is the trial court's denial of

David Moore's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.

The judgment was

entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, Utah,
the Honorable Ray M. Harding presiding.
B. Course of Proceedings.
The plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce in 1986. (R. 3 ) .
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 25, 1987. (R. 58). On
February 27, 1987, Sandra Moore filed a verified Petition for Order
to Show Cause re:

Contempt and Child Support Arrearage. (R. 68) .

In response, David Moore filed a Petition to Modify Decree of

3

Divorce

(R.

95)

and

an

Amended

Petition

to Modify

Decree

of

Divorce. (R. 99) .
Trial on the Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify was
held before Judge Harding on October 27, 1993. (R. 387, R. 454680).

On December 2, 1993, Judge Harding issued his Memorandum

Decision containing his ruling on trial issues. (R. 405).

Before

the entry of any final judgment, Sandra Moore filed a Request for
Supplemental Rulings. (R. 412).
issued

a Memorandum

Rulings.

(R. 414).

Decision
Findings

On March 7, 1994, Judge Harding

on

that

of

Request

Facts,

for

Conclusion

Supplemental
of

Law

and

Judgment were finally entered on April 13, 1995 (R. 420).
On April 24, 1995 , David Moore filed a Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment regarding his past and future obligation to provide
medical
Decision

coverage
of

June

for the children.

(R. 422) .

19, 1995, Judge Harding

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.

In a Memorandum

denied David

Moore's

(R. 443). The Order Denying

Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was entered on July
6, 1995. (R. 444). David Moore filed his Notice of Appeal and Cost
Bond on August 3, 1995 (R. 451-453).

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Decree

of

Divorce

("Decree")

in

this

case was

entered on August 25, 1987. (R.58).
2.

The Decree

was drafted

by

counsel

for Sandra

Moore

Nielson ("Nielson"). (R. 462, 464).
3.

David Moore

("Moore") was not represented

by counsel

regarding the regarding the drafting of the Decree. (R. 459).
4.

Moore

and Nielson

have

six children:

Janessa,

born

August 12, 1970; Holly, born April 14, 1972; Matt, born March 9,
1973; John, born February 12, 1976; Nathan, born July 28, 1978; and
Jamie Lee, born March 22, 1983. (R. 47-53).
5.

The Decree provided that Moore was to pay Nielson the

sum of "$l,500 per month, for alimony and child support." (R. 5458) .
6*

The Decree does not make any specific allocation of the

$1,500 regarding how much is to be paid for alimony and how much is
to be paid for child support per month. (R. 54-58, 462-464).
7.

Negotiations

of

the

parties

before

the

Decree

was

entered establish that $300 per month was to be paid for alimony

5

and $200 was to be paid for the six children of Moore and Nielson
for a total child support payment of $1,200 per month. (R. 460).
8.

Judge Harding specifically found that under the Decree,

alimony was $300 a month and child support was $200 per month per
Child. (R. 403-405, 415-420).
9.
offset

Judge Harding ordered any child support arrearage *to be
by

support."

10.

any

amounts

previously

paid

for

alimony

and

child

(R. 403-405, 415-420).

At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, David

Moore was earning only $2,000 a month.

It was anticipated that

David Moore's income would increase in the future. (R. 471, 630,
54-58).
11.

The Decree stated that the $1,500 per month would not be

reduced or modified before June 1, 1988.
12.

(R. 54-58).

Moore filed his initial Petition to Modify Decree of

Divorce on or about August 26, 1989. (R. 95).
13.

In July of 1988, Sandra Moore remarried. (R. 636).

14.

In August of 1988, Jenessa Moore turned 18 and went to

live in California.

On April 14, 1990, Holly Moore turned 18.

Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1993. (R. 47-53).
6

15.

Moore paid $1,500 alimony and child support every month

from July of 1987 through July of 1988. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, R.
384, 415-420).
16.

In August, 1988, Moore began paying $1,000 alimony and

child support, deducting $300 paid for alimony based on Nielson's
remarriage

in

July

of

1988

and

deducting

$200 per month

for

Jenessa, who reached the age of majority in August of 1988. (R.
463, 415-420).
17.

From August 1988 to April 1990, when Holly Moore reached

the age of majority, Moore paid a total of $16,214 in child support
directly to Nielson. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26).
18.

From August 1988 to April 1990, Moore paid an additional

$1,110 directly to Jenessa Moore for support.

(Plaintiff Exhibit

10, R. 384).
19.

From June 1989 through December 1989, Holly lived with

Moore in Sandy, Utah.
reduced

his

representing

child
support

For that seven month period, David Moore

support

payment

for Holly

to

during

Sandra

Moore

those months.

by

(Plaintiff

Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-420).
20.

Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1991. (R. 47-53).
7

$200,

21.

From April 1990 through March 1991, Moore paid $9,100 in

child support directly to Nielson.

During that period of time,

Moore paid $700 directly to Jenessa for support. (Plaintiff Exhibit
10, Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-420).
22.
payments

From April 1991 to the time of trial, Moore made cash
directly

to

Nielson

of

$9,325,

including

one

$3,000

cashiers check in December 1992/January 1993 and a $2,900 cashiers
check in April 1993. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26,
R. 384, R. 415-420).
23.

In June 1993, Moore gave title to a $3,000 1983 Chevy

automobile to Nielson.

It was understood by the parties that that

was $3,000 toward child support.

Judge Harding did not allow this

as child support. (R. 403-405).
24;

In

addition

to

these

direct

child

support

payments,

Moore paid over $70,000 since entry of the Decree to the time of
trial, either directly to his children or for clothing, cars and
car repairs, food, health insurance premiums, medical expenses,
vacations, gifts, or other miscellaneous
childrens1 benefit. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10).

8

expenses, all

for the

25.
for

COBRA

In September of 1991, Moore had to start making payments
health

insurance

Tiffany's terminated.

coverage

when

his

employment

with

His monthly payment for insurance went from

$91.90 to the COBRA payment of $625 per month.

Moore paid $625 per

month for health insurance through April of 1992, when the COBRA
insurance premium rose to $722 per month.

That $722 a month was

paid through March of 1993, when COBRA coverage expired.

He spent

$8,382 in 1992 in health insurance premiums, and $4,811 for such
premium in 1993, through the time of trial.

Moore then began

paying $260 a month for HMO coverage provided through Metropolitan
Life, his current wife's insurer.

(R. 495-498, Plaintiff Exhibit

10) .
26.
$21,396.30

From August
in health

of

1987

insurance

to October
premiums

of

and

1993, Moore
for Jamie

paid

Moore's

medical expenses. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 10).
27.

David Moore's COBRA health insurance with Aetna has paid

$27,263.97 for medical treatment provided to Jamie Moore. (R. 499,
Plaintiff Exhibit 7).
28 •

Moore filed an individual Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition

on December 22, 1992 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
9

Central District of California, case number LA92-58443-KL. (R. 512,
Plaintiff

Exhibit

8) . Moore

was

discharged

in

that

bankruptcy

proceeding on April 30# 1993. (R. 514-15, Plaintiff Exhibit 9).
29.

David Moore's net income for the years 1987 through 1991

s as follows:

1987 - $20,639; 1988 - $21,197; 1989 - $26,883; 1990

- $37,610; 1991 - $35,404. (R. 471-477, Plaintiff Exhibits 1, 2, &
3).

In

1992,

David

Moore

received

benefits from the state of California.

$10,710.00

in

unemployment

He also had a net business

loss of $7,346.00. (R. 478-479, Plaintiff Exhibit 5 ) .
30.

In 1993, up to the time of trial in October, David Moore

had no gross income, while seeking employment. (R. 481-482).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in concluding that the $1,500 a month
subsistence payment was to continue for a minimum of three years
after

the

remarriage
majority.

decree
or

any

The

of
of

trial

divorce,
the

Moore

court

was

regardless
children
correct

of

Sandra

reaching
in

Moore's

the

finding

age

that

of
the

agreement between the parties provided for $300 a month in alimony
and $200 per month per child in child support.

Nowhere in the

decree of divorce is there an agreement by the parties that $1,500
10

subsistence level would continue for three years.

In fact, the

decree of divorce specifically stated that $1,500 amount could be
modified after the first year. Sandra Moore remarried in July of
1988.

Jenessa Moore turned 18 on August 12, 1988. Holly Moore

turned 18 on August 14, 1990. Under Utah statutory and case law,
the

$300

alimony

remarriage.

payment

to

Sandra

Moore

terminated

on

her

The $200 support payment for Jenessa terminated when

she turned 18, the $200 payment for Holly Moore terminated when she
turned

18.

Because

of

the

Court

Order

requiring

the

$1,500

subsistence to last for three years, David Moore was improperly
ssessed $13,100 in alimony and child support payments.
The

trial

court

required

Moore

to

accept

total

responsibility for providing health insurance for the children,
from July 1987 through October 1993, David Moore paid $21,396.30
in

health

insurance

premiums

and

medical

payments

for

the

children.

Under the trial court's ruling, Sandra Moore has no

obligaiton

to

pursuant

any

of

that

cost.

David

Moore

argues

that,

to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 Sandra Moore should be

responsible for half of that amount and that David Moore, already

11

having paid that amount, should be given a credit or deduction
from any child support arrearage, if any, assessed against him.
The previous argument, that Sandra Moore should bear
one-half
moore's

of

the

argument

health
that

insurance

the

entire

premiums,

applies

$21,396.30

paid

only

if

in health

insurance premiums and uninsured medical expenses, over and above
all payments

specifically made

for child

deducted from his child support obligation.
of the trial court, but rejected.

support,

should be

This was requested

A deduction for those health

insurance premiums and medical expenses paid is consistent with
this Court's decision in Cummincrs v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Finally, the trial court erred in not reducing David Moore's
child support obligation, based on the evidence of his change in
financial circumstances.

In this brief, David Moore has marshalled

all evidence in support of Sandra Moore's claim that support
payments should be increased, or at least not decreased.

The

evidence supports the reduction in child support payments pursuant
to state child support guidelines. This Court should adopt David
Moore's proposed Findings of Fact 30-36 and Conclusion of Law No.
12

11, confirming that, through the date of trial, David Moore had no
outstanding child support obligation to Sandra Moore.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHILE THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
THAT
THE
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE
PARTIES
PROVIDED FOR $300 A MONTH IN ALIMONY AND $200
PER MONTH PER CHILD IN CHILD SUPPORT, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
$1,500 PAYMENT PER MONTH WAS TO CONTINUE FOR A
MINIMUM
OF
THREE
YEARS
REGARDLESS
OF
REMARRIAGE OR THE CHILDREN REACHING THE AGE OF
MAJORITY.
Before

the

Decree

of

Divorce

was

entered,

the

parties

negotiated what amount per month would be paid for alimony and
child support. The parties agreed on the amount of $1,500.

Trial

testimony differed on how that amount was to be broken down between
alimony and child support.
David Moore, through a lawyer he retained, initially proposed
$125 a month per child for the six children in child support and
$750 a month in alimony, totaling the $1,500 monthly payment. (R.
458).

Sandra Moore acknowledges that specific proposal was made to

her early in the negotiations. (R. 629).

13

David Moore couldn't afford his lawyer, and went to a meeting
with Sandra Moore and her attorney.

At that meeting, the parties

agreed on $200 per month per child for child support and $300 per
month for alimony.
specific

division

(R. 460) .
of

alimony

Sandra Moore acknowledges that the
and

child

support

may

have

been

discussed, but does not believe any specific agreement was reached
regarding such division. (R. 623-633).
Sandra Moore's attorney prepared the Decree of Divorce.

David

Moore viewed the document, confirming that it designated the $1,500
per month specifically "for alimony and child support."

At the

time,

it

he

was

not

concerned

with

the

language

because

was

essentially consistent with their agreement, even though it did not
specifically break down the amounts designated

for alimony and

child support. (R. 462).
Sandra Moore remarried in July of 1988 (R. 462). The Moores'
oldest daughter Janessa turned 18 on August 12, 1988. (R. 463).
According to David Moore's understanding of the Agreement between
the parties regarding alimony and child support, he informed Sandra
that he would no longer be paying the $300 a month in alimony
because of her remarriage.

He also informed Sandra that he would
14

be reducing his child support obligation by $200 a month because
Janessa had reached the age of majority.

(R. 462) .

Sandra Moore

acknowledged David Moore discussing such a reduction with her at
around that time. (R. 634).
When David Moore and Sandra Moore discussed these issues in
the summer of 1988, Sandra told David that the Divorce Decree
didn't specifically designate what amount would be paid for child
support and what amount would be paid for alimony. (R. 463) . David
replied that the $200 per child and $300 per month alimony was
"exactly what we talked about." (R. 463).
According to David Moore, Sandra Moore then explained that her
attorney had told her that the attorney had deliberately left that
language ambiguous
$1,500

a

month

so that

she could argue she was to receive

indefinitely,

irrespective

of

marriage

or

the

children reaching the age of majority. (R. 464).
In her testimony,

Sandra Moore acknowledged telling David,

after August of 1988, that the decree didn't designate the amounts
to be paid in alimony and child support, only that $1,500 was to be
paid every month. (R. 635).

Sandra Moore denies that her lawyer

15

told her that he had drafted at the document that way deliberately.
(R. 635-636).
David Moore declared tax deductions for alimony for $300 a
month from the divorce until Sandra Moore was remarried.
and Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 & 3) .

(R. 637

Sandra Moore doesn't remember

if she declared alimony income in 1987 and 1988 (R. 638) .

Sandra

Moore's

during

tax

records

had

been

requested

back

and

forth

litigation, but were not available at the time of trial. (R. 638).
The disputed paragraph

in the Decree of Divorce

alimony and child support reads as follows:
That Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,500 per
month to Defendant, in cash each month, for
alimony and child support during the pendency
of this action. This amount is regarded as a
minimum subsistence level for Defendant and
her six children not withstanding the fact
that Plaintiff is going to accept a job which
will initially pay approximately $2,000 per
month.
The parties are ordered to exchange
financial
information
and
disclose
their
respective financial statements each year and
renegotiate
the
level
of
support
and
maintenance between them once each year for
three (3) years at which time a permanent
level of support shall be fixed. For purposes
of this Decree of Divorce, it is hereby
ordered that the minimum level of $1,500.00
shall not be reduced or modified before June
1, 1988.

16

regarding

There is inherent ambiguity in that paragraph because it does
not break down the amount to be paid per month for child support
and the amount to be paid per month for alimony.

It simply states

$1,500.00 a month shall be paid for alimony and child support.

In

the face of this ambiguity, Judge Harding admitted parole evidence
at trial for assistance in interpreting what the parties intended
by that language.
the circumstances.

Admitting extrinsic evidence was proper under
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have

repeatedly held that a trial court may consider extrinsic evidence
in interpreting the contract once the language of the contract is
deemed ambiguous.
1983).

Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1252

(Utah

Once that ambiguity is established, evidence of prior or

contemporaneous

conversations,

representations,

or

other

statements, for purposes of explaining or adding to the terms of
the agreement,

are admissible.

Hall v.

Process

Instruments

&

Control, 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995).
Having heard all testimony regarding the negotiations of the
parties

regarding

the

$1,500.00 monthly payment,

Judge

Harding

specifically found that, of that $1,500 amount, $300 per month was
17

for alimony, and $200 per month per child was for child support (R.
403-405, 415-420).
David Moore submits that such a finding was appropriate and
fully supported by the evidence.

That finding of fact may not be

overturned unless clearly erroneous.

The error assigned by David

Moore on this issue goes not to that finding of fact, but rather to
Judge Harding's conclusion of law based on that finding of fact.
Even though Judge Harding found that $300 a month was for
alimony and $200 child per month was for child support, he went on
to conclude that that $1,500.00 subsistence level was to remain in
place for three years, irrespective of the remarriage of Sandra
Moore or any of the Moore children reaching the age of majority.
That conclusion of law is contrary to Utah statute and case law, as
well as being contrary to the language of the Decree of Divorce.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (5) provides, in relevant, as follows:
Unless a Decree of Divorce
specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage
of that former spouse.
In this

case, the Decree

of Divorce

did

state

that

*the

minimum level of $1,500.00 shall not be reduced or modified before
18

June

1,

1988."

$1,500.00

monthly

It

is

undisputed

payment

accordance with the Decree.

that

took place

no

before

reduction
June

1,

of

that

1998,

in

David Moore filed his initial petition

to modify the Decree of Divorce on or about August 26, 1989 (R.
95) .
There
alimony

continues

unmarried.
1954).

is implicit
only

in a divorce decree
so

long

as

the

the provision that

divorcing

wife

remains

Austad v. Austad. 2 Utah.2d 49, 269 P.2d 284

A wife's

remarriage

to another man

(Utah

after her divorce

terminates her former husband's duty to pay alimony.

Russell v.

Russell. 587 P.2d 133 (Utah 1978).
The Divorce Decree in this case does not specifically provide
that alimony is to continue after Sandra Moore's remarriage.

The

provision that the $1,500 subsistence level is to be maintained at
least until June 1, 1998 does not apply because Sandra Moore was
married in July of 1988, after that provision expired by its own
terms.

As such, under Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (5) and Utah case law

authority, Judge Harding erred in concluding that the $300 alimony
payment was to be made for three years from the date of the Divorce
Decree.

That

ruling required the $300 alimony payment
19

for 25

months after Sandra Moore's remarriage, for a total unjustified
alimony payment of $7,500.00.

That amount should be credited, as a

matter of law, against any alleged child support arrearage in this
case, if any.
Regarding child support, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10 provides
as follows:
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or
has graduated from high school during the
child's
normal
and
expected
year
of
graduation, whichever occurs later, the base
child support award is automatically reduced
to reflect the lower based combined child
support obligation shown in the table for the
remaining
number
of
children
due
child
support, unless otherwise provided in the
child support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per
child amount, derived from the base child
support award originally ordered.
Based on Judge Harding's ruling, David Moore is entitled to
credit for all child support payments required of him under the
court's order for Janessa Moore and Holly Moore, after they reached
the age of majority.

Janessa Moore turned 18 on August 12, 1988.

Holly Moore turned 18 on April 14, 1990.

As mentioned, the trial

court required the payment of $200 per month per child for three
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years after the entry of the Decree of Divorce, or from August 25,
1987 to August

25, 1990.

The court

also required the

$1,500

monthly payment to remain in force for at least one year.

As

Janessa Moore did not turn 18 until after that one year period, the
$200 a month payment required David Moore for Janessa from August
of 1988 to August of 1990 is improper and should be a credit
against
support.

any

alleged

arrearage

for

child

That amount is $4,800 ($200 a month x 24 months).

Holly

Moore turned 18 on August

owed

14, 1990.

by

David

Moore

The trial court's ruling

required David Moore to continue paying $200 a month for child
support for an additional four months, for a total overcharge of
$800.

That

total

of

$5,600

should

be

credited

against

the

arrearage, if any, owed by David Moore for child support.
Based on the above argument and authorities, trial court erred
in concluding that the $l,^p0 subsistence level was to remain in
effect for three years after the date of the Decree of Divorce.
That error has resulted in David Moore being assessed $13,100 in
alimony and child support payments that he is not required to make
under Utah statute, Utah case law, or the Decree of Divorce itself.
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As such, that $13,100 amount should be credited against any child
support arrearage ultimately owed by David Moore.
POINT II
SANDRA MOORE SHOULD SHARE EQUALLY IN THE COST
OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND PAYMENT OF UNINSURED
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-45-7.1

provides,

in

pertinent

part,

as

part,

as

follows:
The court shall include the following in its order:
(1) A provision assigning responsibility
for the payment of reasonable and necessary
medical expenses for the dependent children;
(2) A provision requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate insurance for
the medical
expenses
of
the
dependent
children, if coverage is or becomes available
at a reasonable cost.
Utah

Code Ann.

§78-45-7.15

provides,

in pertinent

follows:
(1) The court shall order that insurance
for the medical expenses of the minor children
be provided by a parent if it is available at
a reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be
ordered to maintain insurance for medical
expenses, the court or administrative agency
may consider the:
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Reasonableness of the cost;
Availability of a group
insurance policy;
Coverage of the policy; and
Preference of the custodial parent.

(3) The order shall require each parent
to share equally
the
out-of-pocket
costs
of the premium actually paid by a parent for
the childrens portion of insurance. . .
(5) The order shall require each parent
to share equally all reasonable and necessary
uninsured
medical
expenses,
including
deductibles and co payments, incurred for the
dependent children and actually paid by the
parents.

In this case, Judge Harding required David Moore to accept all
responsibility to provide health insurance for the children.

From

August of 1987 to October of 1993, he paid $21,396.30 to fulfill
that obligation.
Under the Judgment

entered by this Court, Sandra Moore does

not bear any responsibility for any of the premium payments, nor is
she

responsible

expenses.

The

for

any

plaintiff

deductibles,

copayments,

submits

this

that

evidence, as well as the above-quoted statutes.
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is

or

uninsured

contrary

to

the

pavid Moore should receive a credit or deduction in any child
support arrearage of $10, 698.15.

This argument applies only if

this Court rejects Point III now addressed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CASH
PAYMENTS MADE DIRECTLY TO THE CHILDREN, AND
OTHER EXPENSES PAID ON BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN,
INCLUDING
HEALTH
INSURANCE
PAYMENTS
AND
PAYMENTS FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES, ARE NOT TO BE
CONSIDERED CHILD SUPPORT.

At trial, David Moore presented Exhibit 10, which was a month
by month ledger of child support and health insurance payments made
by him for the years 1987 through 1993.

For ease in reference, a

copy of the Exhibit is attached in the Addendum.

At the end of

trial, David Moore's counsel presented Proposed Findings of Fact
and conclusions of Law to Judge Harding.

The conversation between

Moore's counsel and Judge Harding regarding the submission of those
Findings and Conclusions is contained on Page 674 of the Trial
Transcript.

The plaintiff later submitted Supplemental Proposed

Findings

Fact

of

and

Conclusions

of

Law.

(R.

389-399).

In

preparing this Appeal Brief, counsel for the plaintiff has noted
that the Record Index prepared by the Fourth Judicial District
24

Court

does

Conclusions

not
of

identify
Law

faxed

the
to

initial
the

Court

Findings
before

of
trial

Fact

and

and

then

delivered to Judge Harding the afternoon of trial, as evidenced by
the Trial Transcript.
While most of those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were not adopted by the trial court, they are relevant
presentation of David Moore's issues on appeal.

to the

As such, David

Moore requests that those proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, attached in their entirety in the Addendum, be included as
part of the record on appeal.

This request is consistent with Rule

11 (h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states, in
part, as follows:
If anything material to either party is
omitted from the record by error or accident
or is misstated, the parties by stipulation,
the trial court, or the appellate court,
either
before
or
after
the
record
is
transmitted, may direct that the omission or
misstatement be corrected and if necessary
that a supplemental record be certified and
transmitted.

Under

that

rule,

if

Sandra

Moore

has

any

objection

to

supplementing the record with that document, she may have ten days
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from the date this Appeal Brief is filed within which to serve such
objections.
At trial, David Moore testified about the insurance premiums
paid over the years after the divorce, as well as the many gifts
made directly to the children in the form of cash, clothing, cars,
car repairs, food, vacations, and other gifts.
evidence,

David Moore's

Proposed

Finding

of

Fact

Based on that
22

stated

as

follows:
In addition to these direct child support
payments, David Moore has paid over $70,000
since entry of the Decree either directly to
his children or for clothing, cars and car
repairs, food, vacations, gifts, or other
miscellaneous expenses, all for the childrens'
benefit.

Based on that evidence, as well as testimony of actual child
support payments made, Conclusion of Law 11 read as follows:
Under all of the circumstances presented by
the evidence, David Moore is current in his
child support obligation to Sandra Moore
Nielson.
It was intended by David Moore that the other expenses listed
as child support include all the specific health insurance premium
payments and payment for medical expenses listed in Exhibit 10.
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Frankly, David Moore has not been able to come up with any
convincing

authority

that payments made by a parent

for food,

clothing, vacations, and the like may be tabulated and credited as
specific

child

support

payments.

David

Moore

does,

however,

believe that under the circumstances, the health insurance premium
payments, as well as any direct payments for Jamie Moore's medical
expenses, should be legitimately assessed as child support or, if
not child support per se, that such payments be reduced from any
alleged child support arrearage owed by David Moore.
In Cummings v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472
the

trial

court

reduced

arrearages by the amount

the

plaintiff

(Utah Ct. App. 1991),

father's

child

support

he had paid for medical expenses and

insurance premiums for the children.

On appeal, the defendant wife

contended that the trial court erred in allowing such a reduction.
On appeal, this Court affinned the deduction for medical expenses
and insurance premiums and remanded the case to the trial court for
a proper accounting of any child support arrearages owed.

Id. at

481.
The undisputed evidence at trial confirmed that from July 1987
through

the

time

of

trial,

October
27

1993,

David

Moore

paid

$21,396.30 in health insurance premiums and medical expenses as
follows:
1987 - Premiums of $499.80;
1988 - Premiums of $1,703.30 + medical expenses of $586;
1989 - Premiums of $1,435;
1990 - Premiums of $1,277.10;
1991 - Premiums of $2,702.10;
1992 - Premiums of $8,382;
1993 - Premiums of $4,811.
While David Moore is unable to find convincing authority that
all of the over $70,000 paid directly to or for the benefit of the
children should be deemed child support, authority of this Court
exists to allow the $21,396.30 paid in health insurance premiums
and medical expenses be deemed child support or, if not technically
child

support,

to be

deducted

from

any

alleged

child

arrearages owed by David Moore.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING DAVID
MOORE'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION BASED ON THE
CHANGE IN HIS FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AFTER
THE ENTRY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE-
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support

On or about September 29, 1989, in response to Sandra Moore's
Order to Show Cause re:

Contempt and Child Support Arrearage,

David Moore filed an Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.
Paragraph 8 of that Petition stated:
The Decree of Divorce should be modified
requiring plaintiff [David Moore] to pay to
defendant [Sandra Moore] such sums as the
court may determine based on the parties
income, as set forth by the child support
regulations of the State of Utah, for the
support and maintenance of the four minor
children
presently
residing
with
the
defendant, until each child reaches 18 or
completes
high
school
in
their
regular
graduating class, whichever occurs last. (R.
96-99) .

At

trial,

David

Moore

provided

documentary

and

testimony

evidence that his net income from earnings for the years after the
divorce were as follows:
1987 - $20,639;
1988 - $21,197;
1989 - $26,883;
1990 - $37,610;
1991 - $35,404;
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1992 - $10,710 unemployment compensation - $7,346 net
business loss;
1993 - No gross income while seeking employment.
In

addition,

David

Moore

produced

documentary

evidence

confirming that he had filed for bankruptcy in December of 1992 and
that he had received a bankruptcy discharge in California on April
30, 1993.
In his initial proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, which David Moore has asked to be considered part of the
record pursuant

to Rule 11

(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, David Moore calculated, according to state child support
guidelines, what support obligation would be required based on that
gross income.
through 36.

Those calculations are found in Findings of Fact 30

Based on those Findings of Fact, under the guidelines,

Conclusion of Law 11 provided that *under all of the circumstances
presented by evidence, David Moore is current in this child support
obligation to Sandra Moore Nielson."
In ruling on these

issues,

in his Memorandum Decision of

December 2, 1993 and in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment,

Judge Harding simply concludes that
30

*there is no

evidence that this amount [of support] should be increased."

Based

on his ruling, it is also assumed that there was not evidence,
according to Judge Harding, that the amount should be decreased.
Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable
and necessary changes in child support awards, taking into account
not only the needs of the children, but also the ability of the
parent to pay.
1990).

Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713

The

modification

change
of

a

in

circumstances

divorce

modification conteraplated.

decree

(Utah Ct. App.

necessary

varies

with

to
the

justify
type

of

Provisions dealing with alimony and

child support are more susceptible to alterations, as financial
circumstances
change.

are

subject

to

rapid

and

sometimes

unpredictable

Whitehead v. Whitehead. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In this case, David Moore requested the modification of the
original

divorce

circumstances.

decree

based

on

change

in

his

financial

He requested that the decree be modified requiring

him to pay such sums as determined based on his income as set forth
in the child support guidelines of the State of Utah.
David

Moore

unemployment

presented
compensation

documentary

tax

documentation,
31

return

At trial,

information,

bankruptcy petition and

discharge documentation and other verbal testimony to support the
change in his financial situation since the Decree of Divorce.
Judge Harding concluded that there was no evidence to support
the reduction of the $200 per month for each child.
understands

his

obligation

to

marshall

all

of

David Moore

Sandra

Moore's

evidence to support the judge's determination and then demonstrate
that evidence is insufficient

to support the judge's conclusion

that support payments should remain the same.
837 P.2d 1

(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Watson v. Watson,

In support of her claim that

David Moore was making, or could make, more than he presented by
way of documentary and other evidence, Sandra Moore submitted the
following:
Sandra Moore had been married to David Moore for twenty years
and they had "quite a good" standard of living (R. 651-52) .

When

asked if David shared information about his income, what he made on
an annual basis, Sandra replied, "no, he just really kept me in the
dark.

I was too busy raising our family, I guess, to pry too

much."

(R. 652) .

She testified that when they came to Utah in

1980, they came "under duress" and "did alot of cutting back".
652-53) .

(R.

After a while, they bought a home in Pepperwood and
32

started buying property in Alpine.
over the years
Moore

is

(R. 653) .

capable

of

They built a home in Alpine

She testified that she believes David

working

if

he

chooses

to

and

that

unemployment the past two years is voluntary. (R. 653-654) .

his
When

asked if she believed that David Moore was capable of earning an
income of at least

$5,000 a month, Judge Harding sustained an

objection of lack of foundation.

She was then asked if during the

twenty years of their marriage, there were any years that David
didn't make at least $5,000 a month, she responded,
least that much''. (R. 654) .

XX

I knew at

She testified that David Moore had

told their daughter, Holly, that there was a point when a company
he owned was making $200,000 a year.

There was no evidences as to

what his personal income from that company was.

(R. 654) .

No

documentary evidence of any kind was presented by Sandra Moore to
support her opinion that David could have been earning more than he
was.
In

the

trial

transcript,

from pages

471-483, David Moore

explains in detail his work history from 1987 to 1983, including
money earned and expenses incurred.

Documentary evidence produced

confirm the net income figures previously listed in this Brief for
33

years 1987 through 1983•

Under those circumstances, David Moore

submits that marshaling all evidence in favor of Sandra Moore is
still insufficient, when compared with the evidence produced by
David

Moore,

to

support

Judge

Harding's

conclusion

that

child

support should remain at $200 a month per child per month.
Based

on

that

evidence,

David

Moore

submits

that

Judge

Harding's conclusions regarding child support be vacated and that
David Moore's initial proposed Findings of Fact 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, and 36, be adopted, along with Conclusion of Law 11, that David
Moore had satisfied his child support obligation to Sandra Moore,
through the time of trial of October 1993.
CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

above

argument

and

authorities,

David

Moore

requests that this Court credit him $13,100 improperly assessed in
alimony and child support after Sandra Moore remarried and after
Janessa and Holly Moore reached the age of majority.

Under Utah

Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 David Moore should receive a credit against
any child support arrearage owed for one-half of the $21,396.30, or
$10,698.15, paid in health insurance premiums and for medical bills
from July 1987 to October of 1993.
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That is only if this Court does

not allow a deduction of the entire $21,396,30, which it should
under Cummings v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) .

Finally, based on the evidence of the change in circumstances in
David

Moore's

financial

situation,

Moore's

initial

proposed

Findings of Fact No. 30-36 should be adopted, as well as Conclusion
of

Law No.

11, confirming

that

David Moore

had

satisfied

his

support obligation to Sandra Moore through the time of the October
1993 trial.
DATED this

at
I '*

day of April, 1996,
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.

GORDON K. JENSEN
Attorneys for David Moore
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ADDEWDUM

30-3-4.1

HUSBAND AND WIFE

or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703.
Nunc pro tunc: entering judgment or decree
of divorce nunc pro tunc, 19 A.L.R3d 648.
Vacating or setting aside divorce decree after
remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153.
Necessity that divorce court value property
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11.

Authority of court, upon entering default
judgment, to make orders for child custody or
support which were not specifically requested
in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 A.LR.5th
863.
Key Numbers. — Divorce *=> 88,152.

30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch.
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,

authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court commissioners, effective April 23,1990.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties , separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-^
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide

the day care for the depe
training of the custodial p
(3) The court has conti
new orders for the suppor
children and their suppc
distribution of the propei
necessary.
(4) (a) In determining'
members of the imr
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific
enforcement, the cou:
schedule a provision,
enforce a court order*
(5) Unless a decree of <
the court that a party pay
upon the remarriage of
annulled and found to be >
party paying alimony is m
are determined.
(6) Any order of the c
terminates upon establisl
spouse is residing with a
established by the person
tion is without any sexue
(7) If a petition for moc
court order is made and c
reasonable attorneys' fee:
the court determines tha'
defended against in good
(8) If a petition alleges
a parent, a grandparent, <
Section 78-32-12.2 where
court, the court may aw
attorney fees and court c
other party's failure to pi
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1
1909, ch. 109, § 4; OL. 191'
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 19
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. IK
13, * 1; 1985, ch. 72, S 1; 198
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch.
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, §
Amendment Notes. — Th
ment, effective April 29, 1991,
or obligations* in the introductc
Subsection (1), added Subsec
inserted "and obligations for
end of Subsection (3).
The 1993 amendment by cl
May 3, 1993, substituted "mer
mediate family" for •relatives"
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30-3-5

the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
(4) (a) In detennining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enfnrrp a rmirt ordered visitation; fsrhfrHnle pntpr^fl imder this chaT
utes.

75) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
^t>j Any order oi1 the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
History: ILS. 1898 & C JL 1907, 9 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, 9 4; CX. 1917, 9 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81,9 1; 1979, ch. 110, 9 1; 1984, ch.
13, 9 1; 1985, ch. 72, 9 1; 1985, ch. 100, 9 1;
1991, ch. 257, 9 4; 1993, ch. 152, 9 1; 1993,
ch. 261, 9 1; 1994, ch. 284, 9 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts
or obligations'' in the introductory paragraph of
Subsection (1), added Subsection (lXc), and
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the
end of Subsection (3).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective
May 3,1993, substituted "members of the immediate family* for "relatives" and "best inter-

est" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted
"shall* for "may" and inserted "or defended
against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection
(8); and made stylistic changes.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective
January 1,1994, inserted "or becomes" in Subsection (IXb), added Subsections (lXd) and
(lXe), and made related stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
designated Subsection (4) as (4Xa) and added
Subsection (4Kb).
Cross-References. — Grandparents' visitation rights, 9 30-5-2.
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Title 30,
Chapter 8.
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78-45-7.1

JUDICIAL CODE

mother's health, and set the award at $200 per
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Modification of support
—Divorce decree.
The divorce decree establishes the duty of
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and
a complaint under this section to modify that
duty of support is improper. Mecham v.
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977).
State recovery of assistance to child.
State, which was joined as a party to the divorce action before court entered order deter-

mining husband's obligation for child support,
was entitled to reimbursement from the husband for assistance furnished the child before
entry of the order for support in the amount,
based upon the relevant factors as set out in
this section, as set out in the support order.
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979).
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor,
773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v.
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

r

Utah Law Review. — Note, New Standards
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986
Utah L. Rev. 591.
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband

and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent
and Child § 54 et seq.
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 48
et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 50.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=» 4;
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5).

78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for payment —
Insurance coverage.
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent children, the court in its order:
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent
children; and
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children
if insurance coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost.
ory: C 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the subsection designations, substituted "is or be-

comes available" for "is available" in Subsection (2), and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance
and health care of parties, § 30-3-5.

78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from
662
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78-45-7.10

JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base combined child suppor
award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined child s
port obligation shown in the table for the remaining number of children <
child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support order. ,"M
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from thied
base child support award originally ordered.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.10, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 12.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation.
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award
be reduced by 50% for each child for .time periods during which the order
grants specific extended visitation for that child for at least 25 of any 30
consecutive days. Only the base child support award is affected by the 50%
abatement. The amount to be paid for work-related child care costs may be
suspended if the costs are not incurred during the extended visitation.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by
the number of children included in the award.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.11, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted a third
sentence from Subsection (1) that read T h e
amount added to the base child support award

for uninsured extraordinary medical expenses
may continue uninterrupted" and made a stylistic change in the first sentence.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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78-45-7.14. ChUd si
The following is the B *
BASE COMBE

78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount may be ordered, but
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest level specified in the
table for the number of children due support.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 14.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and functions.
(1) On or before May 1,1989 and May 1,1991, and then on or before May 1
of every fourth year subsequently, the governor shall appoint an advisory
committee consisting of:
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Services;
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council;
670

(Adjusted for
Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income
1
2
Less
than
$200
$200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425

$20

$28

$23
25
28
51
56
60
65
69
74
78

$34
38
42
67
73
78
84
90
96
102

UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-7.16

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

14

?. 10

7$2,140$2,201
8 2,172 2,233
2 2,197 2,259
. 6 2,222 2,285
1
1 2,247 2,310
"• 2,272 2,336
9 2,297 2,361;
4 2,322 2,387
18 2,347 2,412
3 2,363 2,439
»8 2,379 2,445
\ 2,395 2,462
>9 2,411 2,478
,5 2,427 2,495
JO 2,443 2,511
5 2,459 2,528:
)1 2,475 2,544^
3 2,491 2,560 j
22 2,507 2,577j
37 2,523 2,593^
52 2,539 2,610^
38 2,555
33 2,571 2,643 i
A
9 2,587 2,6591
14 2,603 2,6761
29 2,619 2,692 i
45 2,635 2,708]
50 2,650 2/725J
75 2,666 2,741j
*1 2,682 2,758^
06 2,698 2,7741
22 2,714 2/791J
37 2,730 2,80£
52 2,746 2,824,
68 2,762 2,84a
«3 2,778 2,856
99 2,794 2 , 8 7 |
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78-45-7.15. Medical and dental expenses — Insurance.
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums for children are
included in the base combined child support obligation table.
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the table.
The child support order shall require:
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental
expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and immunizations; and
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable and necessary uninsured
medical and dental expenses in a ratio to be determined by the appropriate court or administrative agency.
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost
and the children would gain more complete coverage by doing so, both
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance for the dependent children.
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a reasonable cost or
if no advantage to the children's coverage would result, the parent who
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be ordered to maintain that
insurance.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.15, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 17; 1990, ch. 100, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection
(2)(b), deleted "equally" after "share" and
added the language beginning "in a ratio."

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch, 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred.
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable work-related child care
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of the parents shall
be specified as a separate monthly amount in the order.
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order ceases
to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly payment of that
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the
child support order.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.16, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, ch. 100, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection
(1) deleted "(a) The monthly amount of all
known reasonable and necessary uninsured extraordinary medical expenses and" from the
.beginning, deleted "in addition to the base
child support award" after "to be paid," and
substituted "a separate monthly amount" for
"two separate monthly amounts"; redesignated

former Subsection (1Kb) as Subsection (2); and
deleted former Subsection (2), which read "Unless the expenses described in Subsection (1)
are included in the child support order, or the
parents enter into a written agreement to
share the expenses, one parent may not obligate both parents to pay the expenses."
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID MOORE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 864403096
DATE: December 2, 1993

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M.HARDING
SANDRA MOORE (Nielson)
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Joe Morton
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for hearing on modification to the Decree of
Divorce. Having heard the evidence and argument of counsel, the Court hereby finds as
follows:
1) The parties were granted a Decree of Divorce on August 25, 1987.
2) At that time the parties had six minor children.
3) The stipulation, entered into by the parties, and the decree provide a minimum
subsistence level for the Defendant and her six children of S1500 per month.
4) This amount was to continue for a minimum of three years regardless of
remarriage or emancipation.
5) There is not evidence that this amount should be increased.
6) The amount of alimony is $300.
7) The amount of child suppon is S200 per month per child.
8) At the time of this memorandum decision, only three of the children are still
minors.
9) The total amount owed by the Plaintiff in alimony and child suppon is to be
figured using the following amounts:

-

AWUW A-2.

a) For the three year period from the Decree of Divorce through August 24,
1990, the amount owed is $1500 per month.
b) For the period between August 25, 1990 and March 9, 1991, the amount is
$800.00 per month.
c) For the period between March 10, 1991 and February 12, 1994, the
amount is and will be $600.00 per month.
d) For the period between February 13, 1994 and July 23, 1996, the amount
will be $400.00 per month.
e) For the period between July 29, 1996 and March 22, 2001, the amount will
be $200.00 per month.
The amount owing through the current date is to be offset by any amounts previously
paid for alimony and child support.
10) Plaintiffs cash payments directly to his children of $300 and S700 are not t
considered child support.
11) The value of the 1983 Chevy Citation given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant is
not to be considered child support.
12) All other payment's or gifts by the Plaintiff directly to me children in me form
of cash, clothing, cars or car repairs, food, vacations, gifts, or other miscellaneous expenses,
are not to be considered child support.
(l3) Plaintiff is to provide medical coverage for the childrenj
14) The box seats were not listed in me Bankruptcy and are merefore not subject to
the bankruptcy order or stay. They are marital assets and subject to distribution by this
Court.
15) All other assets were subject to the bankruptcy and not subject to distribution by
this Court.
16) The box seats were a marital asset known at the time of the divorce that have no/
real monetary value. The seats are awarded to the Plaintiff.

17) Plaintiffs interest in KC Partners had a minimal value of not more than Si 000
that should have been divided between the parties. As such the Defendant is to pay the
Plaintiff S500.
18) The Plaintiff is not in contempt of coun
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Coun for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 2th day of December, 1993.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

DAVID N. MOORE,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 864403096
DATE: March 7, 1994

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
SANDRA L. MOORE,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Joe Morton
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Request for Supplemental Ruling.
Having received and considered Defendant's request, the Court hereby clarifies its earlier
memorandum decision as follows:
1) Each party is to pay their own attorney's fees.
2) Interest on the arrearages is to be awarded at the statutory interest rate in effect at
the time the judgement is entered.
3) Regarding child support, the Court confirmed the stipulation previously entered
mto by th parties, finding it to be reasonable. As such, the Coun did not set figures for the
parties' respective incomes. The amount to be paid by the Plaintiff each month until me
youngest child reaches age 18 is oudined in me earlier memorandum.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form pnor to submission to die Court for signamre. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by me Court.

>Htoett*tei/T &

Dated this 7th day of March, 1994.

cc:

Steven Tycksen, Esq.
Gordon Jensen, Esq.

AUG-24-95 TEU 3:51 PM

LONE PEAK LAW OFFICE

FAX NO. 8015531616

P. 1

FILE COPY
Steven C Tycksen (3300)
Lone Peak Law Office
Attorney for Defendant
Post Office Box 480
Draper, Utah 84020-0430
TELEPHONE (801) 572-2700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID N. MOORE,
Plaintiff
vs.
SANDRA

vIOORE,

Defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. 864403096
Judge Ray Harding

Tim niHtif i i,,HIii? on lor Uiil cm Wednesday, Octohn 7.8, 19CJ3, al the lioui of
10:00 a.m. The Plaintiff was present in Court and represented by his attorney Gordon
Jensen. The Defendant was present and represented by her attorney, Steven C. Tycksen.
The parties were sworn and gave testimony and presented documentary evidence. The
court took the matter under advisement and on December 2,1993, issued a
Memorandum Decision. A Request for Supplemental Rulings was filed and the Court
issued a supplemental Memorandum Decision in March 1994. Based thereon the Court
does now hereby make and enter the following bindings ol Fart and (, oncliiMnii1, nt I aw.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1- The parties were divorced by an Order of this Court on August 25, 1987.
2. The Decree of Divorce was based upon a stipulation entered into by the

AftAata#n

AUG-24-95 THU 3:52 PM LONE PEAK LAW OFFICE

FAX NO. 8QI5531618

P. 2

parties. Hie Stipulation provided that $1500.00 would be paid by the Plaintiff as a
"minimum subsistence level of support" for the Defendant and the six minor children that
were living with her as issue of the marriage. This level was to continue for three (3)
years regardless of remarriage or emancipation.
3. The Court finds that of this $1500.00 amount, $300.00 was for alimony and
$200.00 per month was for each of the six children for child support As of the time of
trial, all but three of the children are minors.
4. The Court finds that for the three year period from the date of the divorce
through August 24, 1990, that the Plaintiffs obligation for child support and alimony is
$1,500.00 per month. Commencing August 25,1990, through March 9,1991, the
Plaintiffs child support obligation was $800.00 per month. Commencing March 10,1991,
to February 12,1994, Plaintiffs child support obligation was $600.00 per month. The
Plaintiffs child support obligation was and will continue to be $400.00 per month from
February 13,1994, to Jury 28,1996. From July 29,1996, to March 22, 2001, Plaintiffs
child support obligation win be $200.00 per month.
5. The Court finds that there is not evidence that this amount should be
increased. Regarding child support, the Court confirms the stipulation previously
entered into by the parties,findingit to be reasonable. As such, the Court does not set
figures for the parties' respective incomes.
6. The Court finds that since the time of the divorce the Plaintiff owed and has
paid annually, total alimony and child support as set forth on the attached summary.
Defendant is entitled to a total judgment for child support and alimony arrearages
unpaid in the amount of $26,585.80. Said judgment shall bear interest from the date of

AUG-24-95 THU 3:52 PM

LONE PEAK LAW OFFICE

FAX NO.
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P. 3

entry of this order at the statutory judgment rate of 9.22%.

7. Tie Court finds that the BYU Box Seats and the interest of the Plaintiff in
KC Partners arc marital assets subject to distribution at this time.
8. Tie Court finds that the BYU Box Seats have no real monetaiy value and
awards them to the Plaintiff.

not more than $1,000.00 and orders Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant the sum of $500.00
as her interest therein.
10. Plaintiff is to continue to provide medical coverage on the children*]
11. The Plaintiff is not in contempt of court
CONCLUSIONS OF 1AW AND JUDGMENT
12. The Decree of Divorce in this matter should not be modified, however the
Court interprets the Decree as it relates to child support to mean that the Plaintiff will
pay child support of $200.00 per month for each minor child after August 24,1990, and
$1500.00 combined child support and alimony from August 24, 198 to August 24,1990.
13. The Defendant should be awarded judgment against the Plaintiff for unpaid
child support and alimony arrearages in the amount of $26,585.80 plus interest thereon
at the statutoi) rate i >f 9.22% a p i pursuant to Utah Code Sections 15*1-4fromthe date
of the entiy of this order.
'

Each party shall bear his o

s.

15. The Plaintiff should be awarded all futurerighttitle and interest to the BYU
Box Seats.
16. The Defendant should be awarded judgment in the amount of $500.00 for

AUG-24-35 TtiU
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Plaintiffs interest in KC Partners.
17. The Plaintiff will continue to provide medical coverage on the children.
IS. The Plaintiff is not in contempt of Court

f4ay

Judgi Ray Harding
Distnct Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Jensen
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen and that I mailed
a true and correct copy of the foregoing postage prepaid to the following:
Gordon Jensen
136 South Main #721
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
on this

\(r~ day of March, 1995.

K<m

GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351
Attorney for Plaintiff
620 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7858
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID MOORE,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 86440309
Judge Ray M. Harding

SANDRA MOORE (Nielson),
Defendant.

The plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, moves this Court to alter or amend the judgment
entered on April 13, 1995 to require the defendant to share equally
the cut of pocket costs of the medical insurance premium paid by
the plaintiff,

as well to share equally

all

reasonable and

necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the dependent children.

This motion is

suoocrted bv an accomoanving memorandum.
DATED this

day of April, 1995.
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.

\£3z±
K. JENScN
Y7A

GOREON

WttHnetft- *>

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed this

•day of April, 1995, via first

class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Stephen C, Tycksen
LONE PEAK LAW OFFICE
P.O. Eox 480
Draper, Utah 84020-0480
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IVDEMORANDUM DECISION

DAVID MOORE,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 86440309
DATE: June 19, 1995

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
SANDRA MOORE (NELSON),
Defendant

LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment. Having received and considered Plaintiffs motion, together with
memoranda in support, in opposition and in reply to the motion, the Court hereby denies the
motion. The Court finds that it has specifically ruled and made findings of fact on the issue
of health insurance in this matter and finds no justification to alter or amend that judgment
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form
prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until
such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 19th day of June, 1995.

cc:

Steven C. Tycksen, Esq.
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq.

AltActtMW- £

Steven C. Tycksen (3300)
Lone Peak Law Office
Attorney for Defendant
Post Office Box 4S0
Draper, Utah 84020-0480
TELEPHONE (801) 572-2700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID N. MOORE
Plaintiff

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTIONTO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

vs.

SANDRA L. MOORE,

Civil No. 864403096

Defendant

Judge Ray Harding

After review of Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, and for good
cause appearing herein it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as
follows:
1. Plaintiffs motion is denied.

fopf

DATED and SIGNED this fe'^day of J 4 R « A 9 9 5

M.

JUDGE RAY HARDING
Approved as to form:

Gordpn K. Jensen
Attorney for Plaintiff
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1989

1987
To Sandra
July
August
September
October
November
December

To Children

Health Insurance
$8340
8340
8340
8340
8340
8340
$499.80

$1,500.00
1400.00
1^00.00
1400.00
1400.00
1400.00
$9,000.00

January
February
March
April

May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

.0 Sandra

To Children

$1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
400.00
800.00
800.00
800.00
800.00
700.00
516.00
$9,816.00

$ 200.00 -Nessa

S 566.00
January
February
516.00
March
516.00
April-Holly 18 700.00
May
500.00
June
300.00
July
400.00
August
400.00
September
1,000.00
October
1,000.00
80.00 + $586 Med Exp November
1,000.00
80.00
December
1-00000
$7,898.00

$8340
365.00
365.00
365.00
365.00
$200.00 •- Nessa
200.00 -• Nessa
100.00 -• Nessa
200.00 -•Nessa
$700.00

Holly
Holly
Holly,
Holly
Holly

$1,200.00

$80.00
110.00
110.00
110.00
110.00
110.00
110.00
Nessa
145.00
145.00
145.00
145.00
1SQ.O0
$1,435.00

1222

1988

$ 1400.00
January
February
2,000.00
March
1400.00
1400.00
April
May
1400.00
June
1400.00
July
1400.00
August-Nes* 18 1,000.00
September
1,000.00
October
1,000.00
November
1,000.00
1.000.00
December
$15450.00

200.00 200.00 400.00 200.00 200.00 -

Health Insurance

150.00
150.00
110.00 -• Kids
150.00
91.90
91.90
91.90
91.90
(300) (200)
91.90
500.00-- Holly, Nessa
91.90
200.00-- Nessa
91.90
91.90
100.00-• Nessa
91.90
$1,277.10
$810.00

$100.00 •-Nessa

1992

1991

To Sandra
January
$1,000.00
February
1,000.00
March-Maa 18 1,000.00
April
1,000.00
May
800.00
June
600.00
July
August
200.00
September
300.00
October
300.00
November
December
$6,200.00

To ChiltiIren
$200.00-Nessa

80.00 --Kids

$91.90
91.90
91.90
91.90
91.90
91.90
91.90
91.90
625.00
625.00
625.00
625.00
$2,702.10

$280.00

1993

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October

$2,900.00
$3,000.00
$ 200.00
$2,900.00

$525.00 •- Holly
$ 722.00
410.00 -- Holly, Nessa 722.00
722.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
260.00
535.00
535.00
535.00
$935.00

To Sandra

Health Insurance

$4,811.00

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

To Children

200.00-Matt
$3,QQQ0Q
$3,000.00

$200.00

Health Insurance
$625.00
625.00
625.00
731.00
722.00
722.00
722.00
722.00
722.00
722.00
722.00
722.00
$8,382.00

GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351
Attorney for Plaintiff
136 South Main Street
Suite 721
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7858
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID MOORE,

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 864403096 DA
Judge Ray M. Harding

SANDRA MOORE (NIELSON),
Defendant.

The plaintiff, David Moore, submits the following Proposed
Findings of Fan and Conclusions of Law. •
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Decree of Divorce ("Decree") in this case was entered

2.

The Decree was drafted by counsel for Sandra Moore

Nielson.
3.

David Hijuj i?" was not represented by counsel regarding the

regarding the drafting of the Decree.
4. • The plaintiff and the defendant havt» SJ;K children;
Jenessa, born August 12, 1970; Holly, born April 14, 1972; Matt,
born March 9, 1973; John, born February 12, 1976; Nathan, born July
28, 1978; and Jamie Lee, born March 22, 1983.

kmAwtrb

5.

The Decree provided that the plaintiff was to pay the

defendant the sum of "$1,500 per month, for alimony and child
support."
6*

The Decree does not make any specific allocation of the

$1,500 regarding how much is to be paid for alimony and how much is
to be paid for child support per month.
7.

Negotiations of the parties before the Decree was entered

establish that $300 per month was to be paid for alimony and $200
was to be paid for the six children of the plaintiff and defendant,
for a total child support payment of $1,200 per month.
8.

At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, David

Moore was earning only $2,000 a month.

It was anticipated that

David Moore's income would increase in the future.
9.

The Decree stated that the $1,500 per month would not be

reduced or modified before June 1, 1988.
10*

David Moore filed his initial Petition to Modify Decree

of Divorce on or about September 15, 1989.
11.

In July of 1988, Sandra Moore remarried.

12.

In August of 1988, Jenessa Moore turned 18 and went to

live in California.

On April 14, 1990, Holly Moore turned 18.

Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1991.
13.

David Moore paid $1,500 alimony and child support every

month from July of 1987 through July of 1988, plus an extra $500 in
February of 1988.
2

14.

In August/ 1988, David Moore began paying $1,000 alimony

and child support, deducting $300 paid for alimony based on Sandra
Moore's remarriage in July of 1988 and deducting $200 per month for
Jenessa, who reached the age of majority in August of 1988.
15.

From August 1988 to the beginning of April 1990, when

Holly Moore reached the age of majority, David Moore paid a total
of $16,414 in child support directly to Sandra Moore.
16.

From August 19-

April 1990, Davi d paid ai I additioi lal

$1,110 directly to Jenessa Moore for support.
17.

From June 1989 through December 1989, Holly lived with

Davi d Moore ::i i , Sandy, Utah.

For that seven month period, David

Moore reduced his child support payment to Sandra Moore by $200,
representing support for Holly during those months.
18.

Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1991.

19.

From April 1990 through March 1991, David Moore paid

$9,300 in child support directly to Sandra Moore.
perioc

During that

-i\ : • roore paid $700 directly to Jenessa for

support and $300 directly to Holly for college.
20.

From April 1991 to the present David Moore has made cash

payments directly to Sandra Moore of $9,300, including one $3,1)00
cashiers check in December 1992/January 1993 and a $2,900 cashiers
check in April 1993.
3

21.

In June 1993, David Moore gave title to a $3,000 1983

Chevy Citation to Sandra Moore.

It was understood by the parties

that that was $3,000 toward child support.
22.

In addition to these direct child support payments, David

Moore has paid over $70,000 since entry of the Decree either
directly to his children or for clothing, cars and car repairs,
food, vacations, gifts, or other miscellaneous expenses, all for
the childrens1 benefit.
23.

In September of 1991, David Moore had to start making

payments for COBRA health insurance coverage when his employment
with Tiffanyfs terminated.

His monthly payment for insurance went

from $91.90 to the COBRA payment of $625 per month.

David Moore

paid $625 per month for health insurance through April of 1992,
when the COBRA insurance premium rose to $722 per month. That $722
a month was paid through March of 1993, when COBRA coverage
expired.

David Moore then began paying $260 a month for HMO

coverage provided through Metropolitan Life, his wife's insurer.
Since August 1, 1993, David Moore has changed to a P.P.O. Insurance
Health policy with Met Life at a cost to him for family coverage of
$535 per month.
24.

In November 1988, David Moore paid $586 to Sandra Moore

for Jamie Moore's medical expenses.

4

2ILn

Atffii.Hn, David Moore's health insurer through Tiffany and

Company, has paid $27,263.97 for medical treatment provided to
Jamie Moore.
nly amount payable to Sandra Moore under the Ron
Davis receivable was the last payment of $4,080.92.

That amount

was paid by David Moore to Sandra Moore as follows: $2,000 paid on
January 1, 1988; $500 paid on September 5, 1988; $500 paid oii
September 20, 1988; $500 paid on October 1, 1988; ami $500 paid on
October 18, 1988.
2/.

David Moore filed an individual Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Petition on December 22, 1992 in the United States Bankruptcy Court.
for the Central District of California, case number LA92-58443-KL.
28.

Day i "11 Moure listed Alan Nielson, Sandra Nielson, and

Steve Tycksen as creditors in his bankruptcy to discharge <
related to medical bills, miscellaneous costs, other claims, and
attorney fees.
29.

Having qualified for bankruptcy protection, David Moore

had all dischargeable debts discharged by order of the United
States Bankruptcy Com: t oi s April 30
30.

1^3.

In 1987, David Moore's "gross income" for child support

guideline purposes was $2,132.00 per month.
monthly support payments i

Based on guidelines,

1,98? were $697.

David Moore paid

$1,200 in child support each month from July to December of 1987.
5

31.

In 1988, David Moore's "gross income" for child support

guideline purposes was $2,061.00 per month.

Bases on guidelines,

monthly support payments in 1988 were $612 per month for the first
six months and $559 for the last six months for a total of $7,026
for the year.

In 1988, David Moore paid $13,400 in child support

directly to Sandra Moore and another $700 directly to his daughter
Jenessa.
32.

In 1989, David Moore's "gross income" for child support

guideline purposes was $2,692 per month.

Bases on guidelines,

monthly support payments in 1989 were $716, for a total yearly
child support payment of $8,592. In 1989, David Moore paid $9,816
in child support directly to Sandra Moore Nielson and another
$1,200 directly to his daughters Jenessa and Holly.
33.

In 1990, David Moore's "gross income" for child support

guideline purposes was $3,655 per month.

Based on guidelines,

monthly support payments in 1990 were $979 a month for four months
and $880 for eight months, for a total yearly payments of $10,956.
In 1990, David Moore paid $7,898 directly to Sandra Moore Nielson
and another $810 directly to his children.
34.

In 1991, David Moore's "gross income" for child support

guideline purposes was $3,347 per month.

Based on guidelines,

monthly child support payments in 1991 were $695 a month for three
months and $580 a month for nine months, for a total yearly payment
6

of $7,305.

In 1991, David Moore paid $6,200 directly to Sandra

Moore and another $280 directly to his children.
35.

In 1992, David Moore's "gross income" for child support

guideline purposes was $3,364, or $280 per month.

Based on

guidelines, monthly support payments in 1992 were $73 per month.
In 1992, David Moore paid $3,000 in child support, or $250 a month,
as well as $699 a month in health insurance premiums, or $8,382
total in total health insurance premiums.
36.

In 1993, David Moore has made nothing in "gross income"

under child support guidelines.

He has, however, paid $6,100 in

child support directly to Sandra Moore Nielson, $935 to Holly and
Jenessa, and $4,811 in health insurance premiums.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under the Decree of Divorce, David Moore was to pay $300

in alimony to the plaintiff and $200 per child per month in support
until each child reached the age of majority.
2.

That child support obligation was excessive based on

David Moore's income and was not in line with child support
guidelines•
3.

In August of 1988, David Moore's alimony obligation of

$300 per month ended when Sandra Moore remarried.
4.

In August of 1988, David Moore's child support obligation

was reduced when Jenessa Moore reached the age of majority.
7

5.

From June 1989 to December 1989, David Moore's child

support obligation was reduced while Holly Moore was living with
David Moore, who was providing her total support.
6.

On April 14, 1990, David Moore's child support obligation

was reduced when Holly Moore reached the age of majority.
7.

On March 9, 1991, David Moore's child support obligation

reduced when Matt Moore reached the age of majority.
8.

Because of David Moore's bankruptcy

discharge, any

property settlement between the parties is discharged, as are any
unpaid medical expenses and any attorney's fees allegedly owed by
David Moore.
9.

David owes nothing to Sandra Moore Nielson on the Ron

Davis Receivable.
10.

Based

on

the Findings

of

Fact, there

has

been

a

substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the Decree
of Divorce.

This substantial change in circumstances merits a

modification in the Decree of Divorce.
11.

Under all of the circumstances presented by the evidence,

David Moore is current in his child support obligation to Sandra
Moore Nielson.
12.

Based on his current financial circumstances, David Moore

is ordered to pay

child support per month, representing

per child per month, for the support of John Moore, Nathan

8

Moore, and Jamie Lee Moore.

That support obligation as to each

child will terminate when that child reaches the age of majority.
13•

Regarding health insurance premiums/

DATED this

day of October, 1993.
By the Court:

Ray M. Harding
District Court Judge
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